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Can increasing religiosity foster democratization in Ukraine? 
Ksenia Gatskova 
Stable democracies are characterized by the predominance of certain values and political orientations. Ukraine, as a 
newly independent post-Soviet state, chose a democratic path toward its development and over the last two decades it 
experienced massive changes including transformations in the religious sphere. Statistical and survey data suggest 
that religiosity has significantly increased in Ukraine after independence. It is however not clear, whether religious 
people differ from the rest of the population with respect to socio-demographic characteristics, what kind of religiosity 
has increased and whether this growth can foster the democratic development of the society? This report presents the 
results of an explorative study of the link between the degree of religiosity and political orientations of the Ukrainian 
population. 
In church we trust 
Many scholars consider the communist ideology of the 
Soviet Union as a form of civil religion (Ryklin 2008, 
Maier 2003), which had its own symbols, heroes and 
proclaimed that the final goal of the Soviet state’s de-
velopment was to achieve a “communist paradise”. This 
ideology had been suppressing traditional religions in 
the Soviet republics for many decades. The Soviet state 
considered traditional religions to be the “opiate of the 
masses”, although to some extent tolerated the Russian 
Orthodox Church, which was used as an instrument of 
control over religious people. In the 1980s, when the 
failure of the Marxist-Leninist ideology began to be ob-
vious, people started to turn away from the communist 
idols and traditional religions experienced a revival. 
Sociological surveys of 1989–1991 have captured the 
first wave of religiosity growth and have shown that 
Uzbeks, Lithuanians and Ukrainians were the three 
most religious nationalities on the eve of USSR’s disso-
lution (Lewada 1993).  
The second wave of religiosity growth among the popu-
lation was reflected in sociological surveys in the late 
1990s (figure 1). According to the data of the European 
Values Survey and World Values Survey, the share of 
people in Ukraine who declared themselves religious 
increased from 58% in 1996 to 81.3% in 2008. On the 
other hand, the proportion of those who described 
themselves as “not a religious person” decreased from 
28.6% in 1996 to 11.6% in 2008.  
Together with growing religiosity, there was an increase in 
the number of religious institutions in Ukraine. Official 
statistical data show that the number of religious institu-
tions constantly grew between 2001 and 2013 (table 1). 
Figure 1: Subjective religiosity 
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Table 1: Religious institutions 
Source: Ukraine in numbers (2013). 
There are at least three theoretical approaches explaining 
the rise in religiosity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The first approach refers to the post-communist institu-
tional transformation. In the background of the crisis of 
trust in political institutions such as national parliament, 
government, political parties etc. the level of trust in 
church as a non-political social institution was rather high 
and significantly grew over 2000–2010 (figure 2). 
Figure 2: Trust in institutions 
Even non-religious people in Ukraine often trust the 
church more than political institutions. It means that the 
church plays an important role in Ukrainian society and 
is perceived as a more reliable institution compared 
with many state institutions.  
The second approach explains the rise in religiosity as 
a consequence of the ideological vacuum, which oc-
curred as soon as the crisis of the communist ideology 
became obvious. According to this approach, people 
turned to traditional religions because they proposed a 
system of values that appeared to be a suitable substi-
tute for the Soviet ideology. As a result, the church as a 
social institution has considerably strengthened its posi-
tion by providing a compensatory system of values, 
which was readily perceived by the people since there 
was a large demand for the ultimate source of the moral 
standards in the population. 
The third theoretical approach describes the mechanism 
of religiosity growth using the threshold models of collec-
tive behavior. According to these models people choose 
their orientations and behavior patterns based on how 
widespread these orientations and patterns are in their 
social networks. The larger the number of people who 
share religious values or perform religion-related activities 
in a person’s environment, the more likely this person is 
to conform and to adopt the same behavior patterns. 
The focus of this present report is on the following ques-
tions: What kind of religiosity increased in Ukraine? Do 
religious people differ from the rest of the population with 
respect to the socio-demographic characteristics? And is 
there a relationship between the degree of religiosity and 
political orientations of people? The answers to these 
questions will shed light on the nature of religiosity 
growth in Ukraine and clarify if the religiosity of people is 
reflected in their behavior and political orientations. 
Nominal belonging or true believer? 
Today, Ukraine clearly stands out among other post-
Soviet states as a country offering more religious free-
doms and is as a result characterized by a higher level 
of religious pluralism.  
Figure 3: Religious denominations, 2010 
According to the European Social Survey (ESS 2010) 
approximately 70% of the Ukrainian population reported 
belonging to one of the religious denominations, while 
the remaining 30% of the population stated that they do 
not belong to any particular religion or denomination 
(figure 3). The largest religious group is represented by 
the Orthodox church of the Moscow patriarchate (31%). 
Almost as significant is the Ukrainian Orthodox church of 
the Kyiv patriarchate (27%). Other important religious 
groups include the Greek-Catholic church (7%), mostly 
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   2001   2006 2009    2010   2011 2012 2013 
Total (institutions) 24311 30507 32639 33351 33977 34586 35116 
Centers, administrations (bishoprics, diocese etc.) 241 299 340 350 362 375 382 
Communities 23400 29262 31257 31940 32521 33099 33581 
Monasteries 277 386 432 439 459 471 500 
Missions 214 309 340 347 357 360 370 
Frateries 53 76 74 76 78 80 81 
Religious educational institutions 126 175 196 199 200 201 202 
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active in the western oblasts of Ukraine, and Muslims 
(1%), concentrated in the South of the country.   
Although the information on subjective religiosity and 
religious denominations gained from quantitative sur-
veys provides a general overview of the religious sit-
uation, this information does not allow distinguishing 
between true believers and people expressing nominal 
religious belonging. The former are likely to differ from 
the latter in their values and, hence, behavior patterns. 
In order to assess the degree of religiosity of the 
Ukrainian population, a cluster analysis was conduct-
ed using the data of the International Social Survey 
Programme collected in 2008 (ISSP 2012). 
A statistically stable solution, which provided a plausi-
ble interpretation of the results, implied four clusters 
(i.e.,religious groups) (table 2). These groups include 
similar individuals with respect to the information con-
tained in the following variables:  
1. “Believer” – the variable that indicates if a person be-
lieves in God (code 3), hesitates (code 2), or does not
believe in God (code 1).
2. “Subjective religiosity” – self-assessments of people on
a 7-point scale from 1 – “Extremely religious” to 7 –
“Extremely non-religious”.
3. “Church attendance” – the variable which represents
answers to the question “How often do you attend
church?” using a 9-point scale from 1 – “Never” to 9 –
“Several times a week”.
4. “Prayer” – information on frequency of prayer provided
by respondents using a scale from 1 – “Never”, to 11 –
“Several times a day”.
The clusters are ranked in accordance with the degree 
of religiosity they represent. The first cluster (A) can be 
labeled religious churchgoers and it includes the most 
religious people, while cluster D contains the least reli-
gious people (non-religious).  
Religious churchgoers in Ukraine on average go to 
church nearly every week and pray once a day. This 
cluster is the smallest group, while the largest one is the 
group of moderate believers – people, who generally 
describe themselves as somewhat religious, attend 
church several times a year and pray several times a 
week. The third cluster includes passive believers, who 
attend church several times a year and pray about once 
a month. Finally, the fourth cluster represents non-
religious people, who never pray and attend church less 
than once a year. The proportion of people who do not 
believe in God is the largest in this group. 
Table 2: Religious groups 
The East-West gap in religiosity 
The distribution of religious groups is not even among 
Ukrainian regions (figure 4). The largest proportion of reli-
gious churchgoers is found in the Western region1 of 
Ukraine (41.3%). In this region the share of non-religious 
people is very small – roughly 3%. 
Figure 4: Religious groups in Ukrainian regions 
On the other hand, in Central, Southern and Eastern 
regions the shares of non-religious people are considera-
bly larger; so much that the representatives of the least 
religious group outnumber religious churchgoers. In all 
regions the proportion of moderate believers is quite large 
and ranges from 27% in the East to 39% in the West. The 
share of passive believers goes up to 32% in the Eastern 
region and is almost twice as small in the West. 
The results of sociological surveys suggest that the 
sharp rise in religiosity of people in Ukraine happened 
predominantly in the Eastern, Southern and Central 
regions, since in the West of Ukraine the level of religi-
osity was already very high.  
According to the World Values Survey (WVS 2009) 
and European Values Survey (EVS 2011), between 
1996 and 2008 the increase in subjective religiosity 
went up to 32% in the East, 22.5% in the South, and 
23.3% in the Centre, while in the Western region it 
went up to 8.9%.  
Who are the true believers? 
Figure 5 presents a distribution of socio-demographic 
characteristics such as gender, education, age and 
family income of the whole population of Ukraine and of 
religious people, defined here as individuals who belong 
to the clusters A and B, that is, religious churchgoers 
and moderate believers.  
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Cluster A 
Religious churchgoers 
Cluster B  
Moderate believers 
Cluster C 
Passive believers 
Cluster D 
Non-religious 
Believer Yes (2.97) Yes (2.84) Yes (2.63) Yes & no (1.95) 
Subjective religiosity Somewhat religious (2.7) Somewhat religious (3) Somewhat religious (3.4) Somewhat non-religious (4.7) 
Church attendance Nearly every week Several times a year Several times a year Less than once a year 
Prayer Once a day Several times a week About once a month Never 
N 238 586 492 519 
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Figure 5. Socio-demographic profiles 
Gender distribution in religious groups reflects a world-
wide trend; – women tend to be more religious than 
men. Women constitute nearly 72% of the most reli-
gious groups (cluster A and B) in Ukraine. 
As far as the level of education is concerned, reli-
gious people tend to be less educated: the proportion 
of people with higher and vocational education is 
lower among religious individuals, while the share of 
those with secondary general education and less is, 
respectively, higher. There are less young people 
among the most religious citizens. Approximately 
40% of the religious population is made up of people 
over 55 years old. Religious people also tend to have 
lower earnings and family incomes compared to non-
religious people (the average number of members in 
households of religious and non-religious respon-
dents is not significantly different). This set of differ-
ences in socio-demographic characteristics between 
religious and non-religious people corresponds to 
the common picture typically found in Western de-
mocracies. 
Who can be the engine of political transformation? 
Social scientists argue that religious values essentially 
affect people’s political orientation (e.g. Hayes 1995). 
Religious affiliation is regarded as an important deter-
minant of a person’s attitude, perception and values. 
Since religion provides a frame of reference for people’s 
behavior and forms a particular worldview among reli-
gious people, it affects, among other things, their politi-
cal understanding, aspirations and actions. Therefore, a 
hypothesis may be formulated that the rise in religiosity 
among Ukrainian citizens in the last decade is associ-
ated with a values shift, which can lead to a transforma-
tion of political orientations. The question is whether 
religious groups in Ukraine share rather authoritarian 
political attitudes and values or if they adhere to democ-
ratic ideas, and thus can foster the democratization of 
the society. 
Democratic political orientations are understood as 
orientations typical for liberal democracies character-
ized by the protection of human rights, universal politi-
cal freedoms  and ensuring the rule of law. The ISSP 
dataset provides several indicators that may be consid-
ered for the operationalization of political orientations. In 
the following, three major dimensions are considered: 
trust, activism and equality. The first indicator is gener-
alized social trust, which points to the general level of 
social capital in a society derived from answers to the 
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that peo-
ple can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people?“. The more inclined people are to 
trust others, the more prone they are for cooperation 
with other people and the more open is the society they 
live in.  
Political participation and attitudes toward one’s role in 
the political process can be operationalized through 
voting behavior (whether a person voted in the last 
election or not) and the degree of agreement to the 
statement “There is little that people can do to change 
the course of their lives”. The less people believe they 
can change their lives, the less motivation they have to 
alter the existing order.  
Absence of profound and reflective interest in politics 
measured by social surveys can be measured by the 
absence of party preference. Approximately half of the 
population in Ukraine who answered the ISSP-2008 
question “There are more than 100 political parties in 
Ukraine. Which party do you feel affiliated with?” was 
not able to indicate a political party, which they felt 
closer to. Voting behaviour, inclination to fatalism and 
political party preferences are indicators of personal 
activism. 
Equality, non-discrimination and pluralism are important 
democratic values. These values are shaping the an-
swers of respondents when they express agreement or 
disagreement to the statements: “All religious groups in 
Ukraine should have equal rights” and “We must re-
spect all religions.” Orientations toward traditional or 
modern gender roles were assessed by analyzing the 
degree of agreement or disagreement to the statement 
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“A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look 
after the home and family”. Non-discriminatory attitudes 
represent people’s orientations towards equality.
Using an explorative method of visualization of the rela-
tionships between multiple categorical variables in a two-
dimensional space – a correspondence analysis – im-
plied a diagram presented in figure 6. The following dia-
gram visualizes the relationship of religious clusters A–D 
and political orientations: trust, activism, and equality.
Figure 6: Correspondence analysis 
Red points on the diagram numbered from 1 to 4 
correspond to the clusters from A to D as described 
in Table 2. Blue points refer to the political orientation 
variables. The closer the points are to the zero value, 
the less they differ from the average population 
profile. The first two clusters – religious churchgoers
and moderate believers – are found on the left-side 
of the graph, closer to the points labeled “equal”, 
“respect”, “voted”, and “trust”. These results suggest 
that religious people are inclined to share more dis-
tinctly the values of participatory pluralistic democra-
cy. They tend to support equal rights for all religious 
groups and respect all religions. Furthermore, they 
trust people more strongly and participate in elec-
tions. However, the proximity of the “no preference” 
point to these clusters suggests that religious people 
often have no political preferences. In other words, 
they cannot indicate a party that represents their 
interests.  
It is remarkable that a higher degree of religiosity is 
directly associated with the belief that people can do 
little to change their lives. In contrast, non-religious
people appear more confident in their abilities – they 
rather tend to disagree with the fatalistic statement that 
people can do little to change their lives. The cluster of 
passive believers (cluster C) and to a higher extent the 
one of non-religious people (cluster D) are located clos-
er to the indicators of non-democratic political orienta-
tions: unequal rights of religious groups and absence of 
respect for all religions. Moreover, less religious people 
are more suspicious toward others and trust people in 
general less than religious people do. Nevertheless, it 
seems that they feel better represented by the existing 
political parties. 
Interestingly, moderate believers tend to support slightly 
more the modern (as opposed to traditional) gender 
roles, while in the other religious groups the association 
is less pronounced.  
Conclusion  
The data of social surveys have captured a rapid 
growth of the subjective religiosity in Ukraine at the end 
of 1990s. A more detailed look at these data suggests 
that the largest contribution to the religiousness in-
crease comes from the Eastern, Southern and Central 
regions of Ukraine; while in the Western part of the 
country, the level of religiosity was already very high. 
Despite their expression of subjective affiliation with a 
church, many people remain rather declarative believ-
ers. For approximately a quarter of the Ukrainian popu-
lation, being a religious person does not imply regular 
church attendance or prayer. 
The highest proportion of religious churchgoers is found 
in the Western Ukraine (41.3%), where the share of 
non-religious people is very small (3.4%). The picture 
in the other regions is quite the opposite: the share of 
non-religious people goes up to one third of the popula-
tion and religious churchgoers constitute about 4 to 
7 percent.
Religious people are more represented by women as 
well as older, less educated and poorer people. At the 
same time, they share to a larger extent the values of a 
pluralistic participatory democracy and tend to trust 
other people. The answer patterns suggest that a 
deeper religiosity is associated with stronger support for 
the idea that people can do little to change their lives. 
Although religious people normally vote, they often feel 
not represented by the existing political parties. Fur-
thermore, empirical data suggest that non-religious
people are less associated with the values of a plural-
istic society, but they hold a more active position toward 
managing their own lives and have higher rates of polit-
ical party affiliation. 
These results suggest that under the current circum-
stances neither highly religious people, nor non-
religious groups can build a solid platform for the 
development of liberal democracy in Ukraine. Demo-
cratic changes can be expected either if religious 
people who share democratic values take a more 
active position and give birth to a new political party, 
which will represent their interests; or if a value shift 
towards more democratic orientations takes place 
among non-religious people (including passive be-
lievers). 
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Notes 
1 Regions: West: Volyns’ka, Zakarpats’ka, Ivano-
Frankivs’ka, Lvivs’ka, Rivnens’ka, Ternopils’ka, 
Černiveс’ka; Centre: Kyjiv, Kyjivs’ka, Vinnyc’ka, 
Žytomyrs’ka, Kirovograds’ka, Poltavs’ka, Sums’ka, 
Chmelnic’ka, Čerkas’ka, Černihivs’ka; South: Krym, 
Mykolajivs’ka, Odes’ka, Chersons’ka; East: Dnipro-
petrovs’ka, Donec’ka, Zaporiz’ka, Luhans’ka, Harkiv-
s’ka 
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